The Shape of the Nuclear-Weapon World
Rene Wadlow
Representative to the United Nations, Geneva,
Association of World Citizens
The signing on 8 April 2010 of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) in Prague by Presidents Barack Obama and Dimitri Medvedev is a
modest but symbolic step to signal better US-Russian relations. Prague was
chosen also for its symbolism, being the city where a year ago President Obama
had set out a vision for a nuclear-weapon free world. But perhaps “not in my
lifetime” he had added, knowing that even a sharp reduction in the number of
nuclear weapons held by the USA and the Russian Federation will not change
radically the nature of the nuclear weapon configuration of world politics.
As Jozef Goldblat, a specialist on nuclear weapons negotiations pointed out
“The main quantitative limitations of nuclear weapons apply to warheads
operationally deployed on launchers and prepared for instantaneous firing. The
parties may keep as many as 1,550 such strategic warheads. According to the
agreed counting rules, a heavy bomber designed to carry more than one
weapon is to count only as one. Consequently, the reductions are modest, but
each of these weapons is capable of destroying a city with a population of
several million inhabitants. Warheads possessed by the parties in excess of
agreed limits do not need to be decommissioned. They may be kept in storage
whereas tactical nuclear weapons are not covered at all. The verification of
compliance provisions are far from allowing on-site inspections to the extent
necessary to build mutual confidence. The treaty is to last only seven years.
Even during this short period, each party has the right to withdraw.”
The START is a welcome sign of improved US-Russian relations but does little
to overcome a Russian impression that it is encircled by hostile forces in Europe
and Asia. Wider arms control negotiations are needed to address missile
defense, Russia’s relations with NATO, the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and North
Korea, Iran, India-Pakistan and other Asian Security issues.
This renewed concern about nuclear weapons control comes on the eve of the
May 3-28 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons which will be held at the United Nations in New York. The Treaty which
came into force in 1970 has an article requiring a review conference to be held
every five years, as nuclear issues could change quickly. The first review
conference was held in Geneva in 1975 and has continued each five-year
period. There have been no modifications in the terms of the Treaty, but the
Review Conferences are a prime occasion for States and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to review the conditions of the nuclear-weapon world.
I chaired the NGO delegation to the 1975 and 1980 Review Conferences. We
were able to negotiate a more active role for non-governmental representatives
than in most UN-related disarmament conferences. NGO representatives have
a place in the conference room, interact freely with State diplomats, and NGO
recommendations are distributed to the government representatives. The NGO
delegation has been small, usually some 15 to 20 persons, well informed and
specialists on nuclear issues, often coming from arms control research
institutes. The NGO delegation, of course, does not have a right to vote.
However, government representatives do not vote either, unlike sessions of the
UN General Assembly. The government representatives try to draft a “Final
Document” that must be adopted by consensus outlining the ways that nuclear
rights and responsibilities have been met. Work on the wording of this Final
Document starts prior to the Review Conference and is carried out by a Drafting
Committee during the Review Conference. The Drafting Committee works in
closed sessions without press, NGOs or the diplomats of States not on the
Drafting Committee. A great deal of pressure builds up during the month-long
Review as wording is agreed upon or not. Words on which there is no
agreement are put in square brackets and are discussed with the heads of
delegations and the Foreign Ministry. Since consensus is needed, each country
has a “veto” power and so this gives small countries more say than if there were
votes.
Some years, such as the 1980 Review, it has been impossible to reach an
agreement despite extending the Conference for several days and having a
small drafting group work all night. In the 2005 Review, no Final Document could
be agreed upon. There is pressure not to have two Reviews in a row failing to
issue a Final Document. In 1985, there were many pre-conference efforts made
to reach compromises so that there would not be two failures in a row.
Repeated failures to issue a Final Document might weaken the Treaty which is
the foundation of non-proliferation efforts.
Thus, the NPT Review is an occasion to look at the political issues facing the
nuclear-weapon world. There are basically three categories of nuclear-weapon
States: There are four Great Powers — the USA, the Russian Federation, China
and India. They are Great Powers by their land size, population, economic
position, and culture. They would be Great Powers even if they did not have
nuclear weapons. On these four standards, the Russian Federation has been
declining. Its land size has lessened since its incarnation as the Soviet Union.
Its population declined from the Soviet period as Soviet Republics became
independent States, but even the Russian population itself is declining due to
poor health; its economy is too linked to the sale of energy. Russian culture
without the ideological drive of Marxism has little appeal to non-Russians. Thus
nuclear weapons remain an important criteria of its Great Power status. India
realizes that its status and role in the world has been deeply transformed in the
last two decades but is not fully at ease with the notion of having a Great Power
status and universal interests.
There are two Nostalgic Great Powers with nuclear weapons: France and
England. They still have a certain Great Power status because they have been
at the center of world politics for a long time. They had colonial empires so that
elements of their culture are respected in other parts of the world. Both have
long-established diplomatic services which can use their national strengths to
good advantage. Both are part of the European Union which gives a certain
economic depth. Both England and France would have about the same role in
world politics if they did not have nuclear weapons, but since they do, they play
a certain role in nuclear-weapon strategic discussions.
There are three Existential Nuclear-weapon States: North Korea, Pakistan, and
Israel. All three were created by partition of larger States after the Second
World War. Their continued existence is largely based on their having nuclear
weapons so their neighbours will not attack them. Were the three States to
disappear, they would not be missed by the larger world society so their
existence as States depends on their having nuclear weapons.
There is one State, Iran, which falls somewhere between a potentially Existential
Nuclear-weapon State and a regional power whose position would be recognized
by others even if it had no nuclear weapons. For the moment, a large number
of States would prefer not to see a nuclear-weapon Iran but have done little to
confer on Iran the recognition of its Regional Power status.
The NPT Reviews have always reflected specific geo-strategic issues even if the
theme of the Treaty is non-proliferation and the disarmament of the nuclear
weapon Great Powers in general. The 1980Review was influenced by the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. The 1985 Review nearly broke down as a result of
the Iraq-Iran war and was saved only by an all-night session and a statement on
the Iraq-Iran war relegated to an annex, largely neglected once the Conference
ended at six in the morning. Regional issues such as Iran and Israel are likely to
be the background issues in this 2010 Review.
Therefore we will look in separate essays at the three Existential Nuclear
Powers:
1) Pakistan with its relations to India and Afghanistan in the background;
2) Israel and the potential of a Middle East Nuclear-weapon Free Zone:
3) Iran as a potential Existential Nuclear-weapon State.
And end with 4) The NPT Review — Are advances possible?
North Korea seems to be in a quiet stage for the moment and so we will not deal
with it at this time. Each essay should be able to stand separately, but each is
inter-related in this complex nuclear-weapon world.
Rene Wadlow
Representative to the United Nations, Geneva,
Association of World Citizens
The signing on 8 April 2010 of the new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) in Prague by Presidents Barack Obama and Dimitri Medvedev is a
modest but symbolic step to signal better US-Russian relations. Prague was
chosen also for its symbolism, being the city where a year ago President Obama
had set out a vision for a nuclear-weapon free world. But perhaps “not in my
lifetime” he had added, knowing that even a sharp reduction in the number of
nuclear weapons held by the USA and the Russian Federation will not change
radically the nature of the nuclear weapon configuration of world politics.
As Jozef Goldblat, a specialist on nuclear weapons negotiations pointed out
“The main quantitative limitations of nuclear weapons apply to warheads
operationally deployed on launchers and prepared for instantaneous firing. The
parties may keep as many as 1,550 such strategic warheads. According to the
agreed counting rules, a heavy bomber designed to carry more than one
weapon is to count only as one. Consequently, the reductions are modest, but
each of these weapons is capable of destroying a city with a population of
several million inhabitants. Warheads possessed by the parties in excess of
agreed limits do not need to be decommissioned. They may be kept in storage
whereas tactical nuclear weapons are not covered at all. The verification of
compliance provisions are far from allowing on-site inspections to the extent
necessary to build mutual confidence. The treaty is to last only seven years.
Even during this short period, each party has the right to withdraw.”
The START is a welcome sign of improved US-Russian relations but does little
to overcome a Russian impression that it is encircled by hostile forces in Europe
and Asia. Wider arms control negotiations are needed to address missile
defense, Russia’s relations with NATO, the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe Treaty, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, and North
Korea, Iran, India-Pakistan and other Asian Security issues.
This renewed concern about nuclear weapons control comes on the eve of the
May 3-28 Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons which will be held at the United Nations in New York. The Treaty which
came into force in 1970 has an article requiring a review conference to be held
every five years, as nuclear issues could change quickly. The first review
conference was held in Geneva in 1975 and has continued each five-year
period. There have been no modifications in the terms of the Treaty, but the
Review Conferences are a prime occasion for States and non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to review the conditions of the nuclear-weapon world.
I chaired the NGO delegation to the 1975 and 1980 Review Conferences. We
were able to negotiate a more active role for non-governmental representatives
than in most UN-related disarmament conferences. NGO representatives have
a place in the conference room, interact freely with State diplomats, and NGO
recommendations are distributed to the government representatives. The NGO
delegation has been small, usually some 15 to 20 persons, well informed and
specialists on nuclear issues, often coming from arms control research
institutes. The NGO delegation, of course, does not have a right to vote.
However, government representatives do not vote either, unlike sessions of the
UN General Assembly. The government representatives try to draft a “Final
Document” that must be adopted by consensus outlining the ways that nuclear
rights and responsibilities have been met. Work on the wording of this Final
Document starts prior to the Review Conference and is carried out by a Drafting
Committee during the Review Conference. The Drafting Committee works in
closed sessions without press, NGOs or the diplomats of States not on the
Drafting Committee. A great deal of pressure builds up during the month-long
Review as wording is agreed upon or not. Words on which there is no
agreement are put in square brackets and are discussed with the heads of
delegations and the Foreign Ministry. Since consensus is needed, each country
has a “veto” power and so this gives small countries more say than if there were
votes.
Some years, such as the 1980 Review, it has been impossible to reach an
agreement despite extending the Conference for several days and having a
small drafting group work all night. In the 2005 Review, no Final Document could
be agreed upon. There is pressure not to have two Reviews in a row failing to
issue a Final Document. In 1985, there were many pre-conference efforts made
to reach compromises so that there would not be two failures in a row.
Repeated failures to issue a Final Document might weaken the Treaty which is
the foundation of non-proliferation efforts.
Thus, the NPT Review is an occasion to look at the political issues facing the
nuclear-weapon world. There are basically three categories of nuclear-weapon
States: There are four Great Powers — the USA, the Russian Federation, China
and India. They are Great Powers by their land size, population, economic
position, and culture. They would be Great Powers even if they did not have
nuclear weapons. On these four standards, the Russian Federation has been
declining. Its land size has lessened since its incarnation as the Soviet Union.
Its population declined from the Soviet period as Soviet Republics became
independent States, but even the Russian population itself is declining due to
poor health; its economy is too linked to the sale of energy. Russian culture
without the ideological drive of Marxism has little appeal to non-Russians. Thus
nuclear weapons remain an important criteria of its Great Power status. India
realizes that its status and role in the world has been deeply transformed in the
last two decades but is not fully at ease with the notion of having a Great Power
status and universal interests.
There are two Nostalgic Great Powers with nuclear weapons: France and
England. They still have a certain Great Power status because they have been
at the center of world politics for a long time. They had colonial empires so that
elements of their culture are respected in other parts of the world. Both have
long-established diplomatic services which can use their national strengths to
good advantage. Both are part of the European Union which gives a certain
economic depth. Both England and France would have about the same role in
world politics if they did not have nuclear weapons, but since they do, they play
a certain role in nuclear-weapon strategic discussions.
There are three Existential Nuclear-weapon States: North Korea, Pakistan, and
Israel. All three were created by partition of larger States after the Second
World War. Their continued existence is largely based on their having nuclear
weapons so their neighbours will not attack them. Were the three States to
disappear, they would not be missed by the larger world society so their
existence as States depends on their having nuclear weapons.
There is one State, Iran, which falls somewhere between a potentially Existential
Nuclear-weapon State and a regional power whose position would be recognized
by others even if it had no nuclear weapons. For the moment, a large number
of States would prefer not to see a nuclear-weapon Iran but have done little to
confer on Iran the recognition of its Regional Power status.
The NPT Reviews have always reflected specific geo-strategic issues even if the
theme of the Treaty is non-proliferation and the disarmament of the nuclear
weapon Great Powers in general. The 1980Review was influenced by the Soviet
intervention in Afghanistan. The 1985 Review nearly broke down as a result of
the Iraq-Iran war and was saved only by an all-night session and a statement on
the Iraq-Iran war relegated to an annex, largely neglected once the Conference
ended at six in the morning. Regional issues such as Iran and Israel are likely to
be the background issues in this 2010 Review.
Therefore we will look in separate essays at the three Existential Nuclear
Powers:
1) Pakistan with its relations to India and Afghanistan in the background;
2) Israel and the potential of a Middle East Nuclear-weapon Free Zone:
3) Iran as a potential Existential Nuclear-weapon State.
And end with 4) The NPT Review — Are advances possible?
North Korea seems to be in a quiet stage for the moment and so we will not deal
with it at this time. Each essay should be able to stand separately, but each is
inter-related in this complex nuclear-weapon world.
FOR MORE THAN 20 YEARS, WE'VE WORKED FOR PEACE THROUGH COMMUNITY COMMITMENT, ISSUES INTERCHANGE AND ARTS PRESENTATIONS
Rene Wadlow is the editor of the
online journal of world politics
www.transnational-perspectives.org
and the representative to the United
Nations, Geneva, of the Association
of World Citizens; Formerly, he was
professor and Director of Research
of the Graduate Institute of Develop-
ment Studies, University of Geneva.
He was Founding Secretary of the
European Association of Development
Research and Training Institutes
(EADI) and the former Book Editor of
the International Development Review
as well as a member for 29 years of
the editorial board of Genève-Afrique.
A citizen of the USA, he was educated
at Princeton University and the
University of Chicago.
online journal of world politics
www.transnational-perspectives.org
and the representative to the United
Nations, Geneva, of the Association
of World Citizens; Formerly, he was
professor and Director of Research
of the Graduate Institute of Develop-
ment Studies, University of Geneva.
He was Founding Secretary of the
European Association of Development
Research and Training Institutes
(EADI) and the former Book Editor of
the International Development Review
as well as a member for 29 years of
the editorial board of Genève-Afrique.
A citizen of the USA, he was educated
at Princeton University and the
University of Chicago.
